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The Morning After a General 
Election: The Vice-Regal Perspective
Peter Neary
Everywhere in Canada, election night now produces a television extravaganza, with the 
commentariat out in full force. The next day newspapers chime in with their reporting, as the 
country wakes up to further analysis of what has happened and what the future might bring. 
From the vice-regal perspective, however, the path to be followed after every election is always 
clear and always the same: the conventions of responsible government must be respected and 
politics eschewed. The vice-regal representative is the protector of the Constitution and not a 
political actor: the job is to follow convention, stay away from party strife, and maintain the 
legitimacy of the office. This article looks at the conventions and how they have worked in various 
examples over the years.
Peter Neary is Professor Emeritus in the Department of History, 
Faculty of Social Science, University of Western Ontario, London, 
Ontario.
In our Canadian democratic system, the electorate ultimately decides matters – but indirectly through elected members, and there can be surprising 
outcomes. We have a government and a premier 
or prime minister while an election campaign is in 
progress, and the “term” of a premier or prime minister 
is from the date of swearing in until the date of leaving 
office, a period that can cover several elections and 
legislatures (both realities are often forgotten).  
If a general election in a province or in the country 
as a whole produces a legislative majority for the 
governing party, the administration of the day simply 
carries on in office (that is what happened nationally 
after May 2, 2011). If, following a general election, 
no party commands a legislative majority, a number 
of possibilities present themselves, and in these 
circumstances the vice-regal representative may be 
called upon to act – not politically but constitutionally, 
in accordance with the conventions of responsible 
government. 
What are those conventions? One is that the vice-
regal representative has one adviser at a time (the 
prime minister in Ottawa and the premier in a 
provincial capital) and, except when the maintenance 
of responsible government itself is at stake, follows 
the advice of that individual. Another is that for a 
government to hold office it must have the confidence 
of the elected chamber, the House of Commons in 
Ottawa or the legislature of a province. Confidence 
means majority support on crucial matters, supply 
(money bills) being the leading example. If there is 
doubt about the government’s standing with a newly 
elected house, it must either resign or demonstrate 
confidence forthwith.  If after an election a government 
that previously commanded a legislative majority finds 
itself in a minority position (including being behind in 
party standings), the prime minister or premier may 
choose to resign or, if the opposition forces are divided, 
meet the new house and test the government’s strength. 
If the government is sustained by the newly elected 
body, it can carry on. Alternatively, if it is immediately 
defeated on a confidence vote, it has no choice but 
to resign and give way to another administration, 
assuming one can be formed (one can imagine a 
second election being immediately necessary but this 
seems most unlikely).  
Who should govern is a matter for politicians to 
sort out, though an administration could not carry on 
simply by avoiding meeting a newly elected house. 
If the existing government has to go, the vice-regal 
representative acts when it is clear who can successfully 
govern – that is to say, win votes of confidence. In all 
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likelihood, following a Canadian election this will be 
whoever can unite opposition groups into a governing 
majority. But there is no guarantee that a governing 
party that commands the largest number of seats but 
not a majority will go on governing.  For emergencies, 
the vice-regal representative retains an unspecified 
reserve power to deal with those situations – very 
few and very far between – that cannot be dealt 
with through the simple, well known, and accepted 
conventions of responsible government. 
Examples from Abroad
In recent times the most striking example of the 
latter came in 1967 when, on December 17, Prime 
Minister Harold Holt of Australia went swimming 
on a favourite beach and was never seen again. His 
remains were not found and he was probably a 
victim of drowning (though there have been many 
wild theories). On December 19 the government of 
Australia announced that Holt was presumed dead, 
whereupon Governor General Lord Casey appointed 
Deputy Prime Minister John McEwan as first minister. 
Constitutionally, the totally unexpected was dealt with 
smoothly and efficiently. In Canada, at the federal 
level, a list, in rank order, of ministers who would 
assume the prime minister’s duties in the event of 
incapacity is now published and updated periodically 
by the Privy Council Office. At the provincial level, the 
position of deputy premier may meet the same need, 
thereby ensuring a smooth transition if required.  
Recent events in the United Kingdom have 
highlighted to advantage what can happen in that 
country after the election of what the British call a 
“hung parliament.” Following the general election 
of May 6, 2010, which did not produce a majority 
for any party but put the governing Labour Party in 
second place in members elected, there was an intense 
round of negotiations in which senior public servants 
played a facilitating role. This eventually produced 
an agreement between the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats. While this agreement was in the making, 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown made a clear distinction 
between his political role as leader of the Labour Party 
and his constitutional role as prime minister. Wearing 
his political hat, he held out the possibility of a Labour/
Liberal Democrat arrangement to govern the country. 
In his constitutional role, he understood that agreement 
between the other parties would mean an immediate 
change of government. When the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats reached such an agreement, he 
immediately left 10 Downing St., and the Conservative 
leader, David Cameron, soon arrived there. The role 
of the Crown in all this was symbolic: the politicians 
sorted matters out, and David Cameron became prime 
minister by going to Buckingham Palace and accepting 
the Queen’s invitation to form a government. The 
Queen gave legitimacy to what the politicians had 
worked out among themselves and her action was 
unchallenged.
Canadian Examples
The most famous case involving vice-regal discretion 
is linked to the career of Prime Minister William 
Lyon Mackenzie King, whose name by definition 
looms large in any discussion of the conventions of 
responsible government. In 1919 King became leader 
of the Liberal Party and in 1921 became the first prime 
minister to lead a minority government. Thanks to 
continuing support of Progressive members (he called 
them Liberals in a hurry) all went well for him until 
1925, when his party suffered a serious reverse in the 
general election held on October 29 (Conservatives, 
116; Liberals, 99; Progressives, 24; others, 6). Included 
in the fallen on the government side were eight cabinet 
ministers and the prime minister himself, who was 
defeated in North York (Ontario). Given this outcome, 
one might expect the prime minister to have had 
nothing on his mind the next day but election results, 
but in fact his diary entry for October 30 begins with a 
reflection on news from his fortune teller in Kingston 
(Mrs. Bleaney) about the meaning of a recent dream 
(whoever said the study of Canadian constitutional 
history was dull?).
At 6 p.m. the same day, the prime minister went 
along to see the Governor General, Viscount Byng 
of Vimy. After a polite tea involving Lady Byng and 
other members of the household - “the talk was of the 
weather, the cold, of gardens, etc.,” – the Governor 
General and the prime minister repaired to the library 
for the first of a series of discussions about the next step 
constitutionally.1  In the back and forth that followed 
over the next few days, Byng urged King to give way 
to a Conservative government but the prime minister, 
backed by the cabinet (and prominent constitutional 
lawyer and close adviser J.S. Ewart), decided to meet 
Parliament and let it decide who should govern. 
Throughout his discussions with Byng, King argued 
that whatever the Governor General might think 
privately, “in a public way…he was bound by the 
advice of his Ministers.”2 Ewart told the prime minister 
that Byng “had no right to express an opinion” or 
to ask the prime minister “to do anything.”3 It was 
for King “to acquaint him with the general political 
situation” and “to tender him advice if requested.” In 
the same spirit, King told the Governor General that 
it would be “unwise” for them to correspond about 
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present business and that there must be “complete 
confidence” between them.4  As Governor General, he 
mused, Byng could have “no opinions.”5 This position 
was supported by cabinet, where King found “great 
indignation that the Governor General should have 
any views.”6  
King got his way, though to satisfy the Governor 
General he issued a carefully drafted news release. On 
the crucial matter of who had the right to govern in 
existing circumstances, King had this to say:
With respect to the leader of the political party 
having the largest definite following in the 
House of Commons being called upon to form 
an Administration, the Cabinet holds the view 
that responsible self-government in Canada rests 
upon the principle that the majority are entitled 
to govern, the majority so understood meaning, 
not the political party or group having the 
largest number of members, but the majority as 
determined by the duly elected representatives 
of the people in Parliament.…I am not aware of 
any precedent in Great Britain or in Canada for 
recommending, before Parliament meets, that 
the leader of a party not commanding a clear 
majority in the House of Commons should be 
called upon to form a Government
To summon Parliament and to allow the 
House of Commons to disclose its attitude 
upon division is the procedure warranted by 
constitutional precedent and by the present 
circumstances. To take any other course would 
be to fail to recognize the supreme right of the 
people to govern themselves in the manner 
which the Constitution has provided, namely, 
expressing their will through their duly elected 
representatives in Parliament and in accordance 
with recognized Parliamentary practice.7
Act 2 of this political and constitutional drama 
started when the newly elected House of Commons 
began sitting on January 8, 1926. During this act, the 
private difference between the Governor General 
and his prime minister that had manifested itself 
immediately after the 1925 election became a public 
issue.8 In short, actions of the Governor General 
became a matter of political debate.  Not surprisingly, 
the Conservative opposition, with more seats than the 
governing Liberals, looked for every opportunity to 
bring King’s government down - that is to say, defeat 
it on a matter of confidence. When, eventually, the 
government faced imminent defeat, King made three 
separate requests for dissolution. In one of the most 
celebrated actions ever taken by a Governor General, 
Byng refused his prime minister, whereupon King 
resigned from office on June 28, 1926. 
Conservative leader Arthur Meighen became prime 
minister the next day but, in the early hours of July 
2, the new government was defeated by one vote 
on a confidence motion (a Manitoba Progressive 
member, said to have just woken up, voted against 
the government despite being paired with another 
Progressive MP who favoured the Tories). Meighen 
then requested a dissolution, which was granted. In 
the campaign that followed, leading up to the general 
election of September 14, 1926, King argued that the 
Governor General had acted unconstitutionally by 
refusing his own request for dissolution and that 
Prime Minister Meighen had acted improperly in 
forming a government under these circumstances.  In 
the event, King‘s Liberals carried the day, winning 
128 of 245 seats in the House of Commons; the 
Conservatives won 91, the Progressives 20, and others 
6. On September 25 King again became prime minister 
and three days later Lord Byng exited Ottawa.  Now 
leading a majority government, King, who never let a 
slight pass, subsequently noted that he did not receive 
a Christmas card from the Byngs in 1926.9 
Since these seminal events of 1925-26 – described 
by one scholar as the Rosetta Stone of the Canadian 
constitution: that is to say, events that facilitate the 
deciphering of all subsequent events – no Governor 
General has ever refused the advice of a prime minister 
to dissolve Parliament. Nor, as we now all well know, 
has any Governor General refused the advice of a prime 
minister to prorogue Parliament. Nor has government 
changed hands between parties during the life of what 
we call a minority Parliament. These were elected in 
1957, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1972, 1979, 2004, 2006, and 2008. 
What happened constitutionally after each of them? 
In the election of 1957 the Liberals, having been in 
power since 1935, fell into second place in seats, 
though leading in the popular vote. Following the 
election, a couple of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s 
ministers urged him to meet Parliament and seek a 
vote of confidence. Backed by the cabinet as a whole, 
however, St. Laurent decided to resign and make way 
for Progressive Conservative leader John Diefenbaker 
to form a government. Once the service vote was in (this 
completed the election results), power changed hands 
on June 21, the date chosen by Diefenbaker. The diehard 
Jimmy Gardiner of Saskatchewan, who had wanted 
St. Laurent to meet Parliament, long complained that, 
“for the first time we have a government which came 
into being when the House was not in session without 
being able to demonstrate that it had the support either 
of the greatest number of votes for its supporters, or 
the support of a majority of those elected to the House 
of Commons.”10 The Governor General’s role in all this 
was to accept the resignation of one prime minister 
and appoint another.  
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When another election was held in 1958 (the Liberals 
were now led by Lester Pearson), the Progressive 
Conservatives won a big parliamentary majority, 
but after the 1962 election they found themselves 
again in a minority position. The government carried 
on but suffered another setback in the election of 
1963; this time the Liberals won the largest number 
of seats of any party but not a majority. On election 
night, Diefenbaker said on television that the results 
reminded him of the outcome of the 1925 election 
when Mackenzie King “had decided, as was his right, 
to meet Parliament on the basis that no party had 
a majority.”11 Pressed by close associates, however, 
Diefenbaker accepted that resignation was in the cards, 
but he made no public statement about this, saying 
only that he would “watch eventualities.”12 Matters 
came to a head when, on April 12, “six Créditiste MPs 
delivered a sworn affidavit to the Governor General 
and to Pearson declaring that the Liberal Party had 
the right to form the next government and promising 
their voting support to that government.”13 With the 
Liberals thus positioned to win the confidence of the 
House, Diefenbaker resigned and was succeeded 
as prime minister by Pearson. Again, the role of the 
Governor General was to accept the resignation of 
one prime minister and swear in another – after the 
politicians had sorted matters out among themselves.  
Following the 1965 election, which saw the Liberals 
increase their number of seats but not get a majority, 
Pearson carried on in office and was succeeded, on 
April 20, 1968, by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who then 
led the Liberals to a majority in the election held 
on June 25, 1968. When the election of 1972 put the 
Liberals back into a minority position and saw the 
defeat of four ministers, three members of cabinet, 
most notably John Turner, favoured resignation.14 
Progressive Conservative leader Robert Stanfield now 
claimed the right to form a government, but Prime 
Minister Trudeau, whose party had the largest number 
of seats and the benefit of having led the popular 
vote, carried on and, thanks to New Democratic Party 
(NDP) support, was able to win confidence votes in the 
new Parliament.  In the election held on July 8, 1974 the 
Liberals regained a majority. 
When the Progressive Conservatives under Joe 
Clark won the largest number of seats, but not a 
majority, in the general election of May 22, 1979, 
Trudeau advised Governor General Ed Schreyer to 
call on the Conservative leader to form a government. 
Clark was then sworn into office, on June 4. When 
the new government lost a budget vote (specifically 
framed as a confidence test) on December 13, the 
Parliament elected in 1979 was dissolved and another 
general election held, on February 18, 1980. This 
time the Liberals were returned with a majority and, 
on March 3, 1980, Trudeau, who as leader of the 
opposition had been planning to leave politics, again 
became prime minister.  
A series of other majority governments followed, 
but in the election of June 28, 2004 the Liberal 
government of Paul Martin, who had succeeded Jean 
Chrétien as prime minister on December 12, 2003, 
won the largest number of seats of any party but 
not a majority. Prime Minister Martin’s government 
carried on and won votes of confidence in the new 
Parliament, but when the next election, held on 
January 23, 2006, put the Liberals in second place in 
seats won, Martin resigned and, on February 6, was 
succeeded as prime minister by the present holder 
of that office, Stephen Harper. In the federal election 
held on October 14, 2008, the Conservatives increased 
their seat total, but the government remained in 
a minority position in Parliament. Prime Minister 
Harper carried on in the office of first minister and met 
the new Parliament successfully, winning a confidence 
vote – on the address in reply to the Speech from the 
Throne – on November 27, 2008, immediately after 
the reading of the economic statement that triggered 
a failed coalition understanding among the three 
opposition parties. The timing of this crucial vote 
was duly noted in a government news release issued 
the following day, which quoted Government House 
Leader Jay Hill as follows: “Acceptance by the House 
of Commons of a Speech from the Throne is an 
expression of confidence in the government.…I am 
pleased that the House endorsed our government’s 
general program, particularly with full knowledge 
of the content of the Economic and Fiscal update. 
Yesterday’s vote and today’s motion to communicate 
with the Governor General accepting her Speech are 
crucial demonstrations of Parliament’s affirmation of 
our newly re-elected government.”15 Prime Minister 
Harper eventually served longer at the head of a 
minority government than any other Canadian first 
minister. Now, of course, his party enjoys majority 
support in the House of Commons. 
It follows from the above, the events of 2008 in 
particular - i.e., the coalition agreement and the 
subsequent party controversy over coalition – that if 
we elect a Parliament in which no party has a majority 
and the government decides to stay on, the opposition 
forces seemingly have but one chance to effect a 
change in administration: before the new Parliament 
votes confidence in the government (unless, of course, 
– this is unlikely – a prime minister whose government 
has enjoyed confidence for a time recommends to the 
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Governor General that a different party administration 
be formed). A prime minister who has governed 
successfully during the life of a Parliament – that is 
to say, has enjoyed confidence, no matter how briefly 
(this, surely, was the meaning of Jay Hill’s statement of 
November 28, 2008) – has the weapon of dissolution in 
his arsenal.  
By convention, the advice of a prime minister to 
dissolve Parliament, as with all prime ministerial advice 
(other than advice that is illegal), must be accepted by 
the Governor General.  For a vice-regal representative 
not to do this but set out on his or her own to find 
another prime minister would be to venture onto the 
slippery ground of politics (the very place where the 
representative of the Crown must not go, multiple 
urgings by academics, pundits, and assorted other 
experts to the contrary). Recently, there has been much 
speculation in Canada about how long a government 
must govern successfully – though nobody can put a 
minimum time on it – before a sitting prime minister’s 
advice to dissolve has to be accepted by the Governor 
General. Arguably, the advice of a prime minister who 
has successfully won a single confidence vote in a new 
Parliament must be honoured in relation to dissolution. 
To act otherwise would be to go into politics and risk 
a constitutional crisis. The vice-regal representative 
can never go wrong by putting the final decision about 
who should govern into the hands of the democratic 
electorate, which is where, by definition, dissolution 
puts it.  
Provincial Examples
Since 1867 there have been dozens of provincial 
general elections, but the aftermaths of some stand 
out for the instructive examples they offer of the 
conventions of responsible government in operation. 
Events following the Manitoba election of 1922 are a 
striking case in point: John Bracken became premier 
of the province after an election in which he had 
not been a candidate and in which he had not even 
voted (it would be hard to find a better example 
of the remarkable simplicity and flexibility of our 
constitutional order). Following an electoral upset, 
the winning but leaderless politicians sorted matters 
out; Bracken was recruited by them to be premier, 
and Lieutenant-Governor Sir James Albert Manning 
Aikins then swore in a cabinet that commanded 
majority support in the newly elected legislature – 
that is to say, had the confidence of that body. Though 
politics had taken an unusual and unexpected course, 
the Constitution was equal to the occasion – and the 
lieutenant-governor had stood above the political fray. 
This is the norm. 
The example of what happened in Ontario after that 
province’s 1985 election is also most instructive about 
how our constitutional system works. On February 8 of 
that year Industry and Trade Minister Frank Miller, the 
MPP for Muskoka, succeeded William Grenville Davis 
as premier of the province. At the time, the Progressive 
Conservatives had been in office continuously since 
1943, but when the new government went to the polls 
on May 2, its future was put in jeopardy. The result 
in seats of the election was as follows: Conservative, 
52; Liberal, 48; NDP, 25.16  By contrast, the popular 
vote was split as follows: Liberal, 37.9%; Conservative, 
37.0%; NDP, 23.8%; others, 1.3%. 
Following the election, private meetings took place 
between the Conservatives and the NDP and the 
Liberals and the NDP to determine who would support 
whom. The eventual outcome of these negotiations 
was an “accord,” made public on May 28, between 
the Liberals, led by David Peterson, and the NDP, 
led by Bob Rae. This committed the two parties to a 
legislative reform program, with the Liberals forming 
the government and the NDP agreeing “that for a 
period of two years it would neither move nor vote 
non-confidence in the government.”17 For their part, 
the Liberals “promised not to seek a dissolution unless 
defeated by a specifically framed want of confidence 
motion.”18 Despite all this, the Miller government 
carried on, and on June 4, the new Legislature met 
and heard Lieutenant-Governor John Black Aird read 
the Speech from the Throne. The Conservatives had 
already promised a budget speech on June 25, but the 
immediate business was the address in reply to the 
Speech from the Throne. Debate on this went on for 
eight days and ended on June 18 with the passage, 
by 72 votes to 52, of a motion of non-confidence in 
the government. The next day Premier Miller saw the 
lieutenant-governor and gave him a letter of resignation 
in which he advised thus: “It would appear that the 
Honorable Leader of the Opposition is able to gain the 
confidence of the House at this time.”19  
The same day Lieutenant-Governor Aird issued 
a statement of his own about the formation of a new 
government, as follows:
In my capacity as Lieutenant-Governor of 
Ontario and as the representative of Her Majesty 
the Queen in Ontario, I have this day asked Mr. 
David Peterson to form a government, he having 
assured me that he can form a government 
which will have the confidence of the Legislative 
Assembly for a reasonable length of time. 
On the advice of counsel with whose opinions 
I agree, I have advised Mr. Peterson that the 
agreement between the Liberal Party and the 
New Democratic Party, a copy of which had 
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been delivered to me, has no legal force or 
effect and that it should be considered solely as 
a joint political statement of intent and that the 
agreement cannot affect or impair the powers 
or privileges of the Lieutenant-Governor of 
Ontario nor of the members of the Legislative 
Assembly.20 
Finally, on June 26, in a public ceremony held on 
the front lawn of the legislature and witnessed by 
thousands, the new premier and his ministers were 
sworn into office. Government had changed hands in 
Ontario according to the conventions of responsible 
government, with confidence being the deciding factor 
and the lieutenant-governor playing his part after the 
politicians had sorted matters out.
Correctly, Lieutenant-Governor Aird refused 
interviews about his decision to call on David Peterson 
to form a government, but when asked whether 
history would “treat him kindly” had this to say: “I 
don’t know whether history will or not. I think one 
does one’s best at all times and that’s the standard I’ve 
always tried to apply. Let the historians decide.”21 His 
discretion was admirable and in fact his actions, which 
accorded perfectly with the conventions of responsible 
government, went unchallenged. Trust is at the heart 
of the relationship of the vice-regal representative 
and a premier or prime minister and, as Mackenzie 
King had so clearly pointed out in 1925, this requires 
confidentiality. What the premier or prime minister 
says to the vice-regal representative stays with the 
vice-regal representative and vice versa. That is not 
always an easy fit with today’s 24/7 news cycle but it is 
crucial nonetheless. 
Recently, some have advocated that the Governor 
General should give statements of reasons for decisions 
made in relation to prorogation and dissolution using 
the prerogative powers of the Crown.  The present 
practice of confidentiality, it has been argued, “is 
inconsistent with the ‘culture of justification’ that has 
emerged as a key constitutional value in Canada.”22 But 
Professor Robert E. Hawkins of the Johnson-Shoyama 
Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Regina, 
has made a powerful case for the view that wide-
ranging statements of reasons of the sort envisaged 
would “inevitably draw the governor general into the 
political fray.”23 “The role of the governor general,” he 
writes, is “unique” and the constitution “contemplates 
neither the politicization, nor the judicialization, of 
that role.”24 Lieutenant-Governor Aird’s 1985 public 
statement, of course, stayed within the letter of existing 
conventions about the operation of responsible 
government. He accepted the resignation of Premier 
Miller, swore in a premier who could command the 
confidence of the newly elected legislature, and made 
plain that a political accord had no constitutional 
standing.
Much can also be learned about the conventions 
of responsible government from events following 
the British Columbia election of 1952 and the 
Newfoundland election of 1971. In the former case, 
an election conducted under a new voting system 
(single transferable ballot), produced a result that led 
to complex dealings between Lieutenant-Governor 
Clarence Wallace and Social Credit Leader W.A.C. 
Bennett, who was ultimately sworn in as premier 
(on August 1, 1952).25 The Newfoundland election of 
October 28, 1971 triggered a constitutional crisis, when 
the Progressive Conservatives believed they had won 
the election but Liberal Premier Joey Smallwood, who 
had been in office since 1949, resisted calling the new 
legislature together, despite Conservative appeals 
to Lieutenant-Governor E. John A. Harnum that this 
be done.26 Eventually, Smallwood resigned after the 
Supreme Court of Newfoundland ruled in favour of 
the Conservative candidate in the riding of St. Barbe 
South, where a recount had been ordered but could not 
be completed because of missing ballots.  On January 
18, 1972 Frank Moores finally succeeded Smallwood 
as premier. The new House of Assembly then met 
on 1 March but was dissolved the same day. In the 
election that followed, on March 24, the Progressive 
Conservatives won a commanding majority and the 
good ship Terra Nova returned to even keel. 
In dealing with demanding circumstances, 
Lieutenant-Governor Harnum was advised by Eugene 
Forsey, the country’s foremost constitutional expert 
at the time and himself a Newfoundlander. Like 
Lieutenant-Governor Aird, Harnum acted to the letter 
within the framework of responsible government 
and, in a highly charged political atmosphere, was 
never criticized for the role he played. Forsey’s 
successors in present-day Canada include Peter Hogg, 
who advised Governor General Michaëlle Jean on 
the issue of prorogation in 2008, and David Smith, 
author of the authoritative The Invisible Crown: The 
First Principle of Canadian Government. Citing the 1971-
72 Newfoundland situation, Smith writes that “the 
problem of the reserve power today is not so much 
how to check the Crown’s use of it as how to prevent 
the prime minister (or premier) from abusing it” by 
“testing the limits of ‘responsible government.’”27
Conclusion
On September 1, 1939, with war approaching, 
Governor General Lord Tweedsmuir asked Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King’s advice on what he should 
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wear at the opening of the emergency session of 
Parliament about to be called. Should he go in military 
uniform or should he wear a black morning suit? King 
said he “thought the Canadian people would prefer the 
quieter way of proceeding” – that is to say, the morning 
suit.28 In constitutional as much as sartorial matters, 
“the quieter way of proceeding” – leaving politics to 
the politicians – always has much to recommend it.
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